This work presents the first full implementation of Wave, a postquantum code-based signature scheme. We define Wavelet, a concrete Wave scheme at the 128-bit classical security level (or NIST postquantum security Level 1) equipped with a fast verification algorithm targeting embedded devices. Wavelet offers 930-byte signatures, with a public key of 3161 kB. We include implementation details using AVX instructions, and on ARM Cortex-M4, including a solution to deal with Wavelet’s large public keys, which do not fit in the SRAM of a typical embedded device. Our verification algorithm is ≈ 4.65× faster then the original, and verifies in 1 087 538 cycles using AVX instructions, or 13 172 ticks in an ARM Cortex-M4.

This paper introduces a new key space for CSIDH and a new algorithm for constant-time evaluation of the CSIDH group action. The key space is not useful with previous algorithms, and the algorithm is not useful with previous key spaces, but combining the new key space with the new algorithm produces speed records for constant-time CSIDH. For example, for CSIDH-512 with a 256-bit key space, the best previous constant-time results used 789000 multiplications and more than 200 million Skylake cycles; this paper uses 438006 multiplications and 125.53 million cycles.

As the Internet of Things (IoT) rolls out today to devices whose lifetime may well exceed a decade, conservative threat models should consider attackers with access to quantum computing power. The SUIT standard (specified by the IETF) defines a security architecture for IoT software updates, standardizing the metadata and the cryptographic tools—namely, digital signatures and hash functions—that guarantee the legitimacy of software updates. While the performance of SUIT has previously been evaluated in the pre-quantum context, it has not yet been studied in a post-quantum context. Taking the open-source implementation of SUIT available in RIOT as a case study, we overview post-quantum considerations, and quantum-resistant digital signatures in particular, focusing on low-power, microcontroller-based IoT devices which have stringent resource constraints in terms of memory, CPU, and energy consumption. We benchmark a selection of proposed post-quantum signature schemes (LMS, Falcon, and Dilithium) and compare them with current pre-quantum signature schemes (Ed25519 and ECDSA). Our benchmarks are carried out on a variety of IoT hardware including ARM Cortex-M, RISC-V, and Espressif (ESP32), which form the bulk of modern 32-bit microcontroller architectures. We interpret our benchmark results in the context of SUIT, and estimate the real-world impact of post-quantum alternatives for a range of typical software update categories.

This paper analyzes and optimizes quantum circuits for computing discrete logarithms on binary elliptic curves, including reversible circuits for fixed-base-point scalar multiplication and the full stack of relevant subroutines. The main optimization target is the size of the quantum computer, i.e., the number of logical qubits required, as this appears to be the main obstacle to implementing Shor’s polynomial-time discrete-logarithm algorithm. The secondary optimization target is the number of logical Toffoli gates. For an elliptic curve over a field of 2^n elements, this paper reduces the number of qubits to 7n+[log_2(n)]+9. At the same time this paper reduces the number of Toffoli gates to 48n^3+8n^(log_2(3)+1)+352n^2 log_2(n)+512n^2+O(n^(log_2(3))) with double-and-add scalar multiplication, and a logarithmic factor smaller with fixed-window scalar multiplication. The number of CNOT gates is also O(n^3). Exact gate counts are given for various sizes of elliptic curves currently used for cryptography.

Cryptographic primitives from coding theory are some of the most promising candidates for NIST’s Post-Quantum Cryptography Standardization process. In this paper, we introduce a variety of techniques to improve operations on dyadic matrices, a particular type of symmetric matrices that appear in the automorphism group of certain linear codes. Besides the independent interest, these techniques find an immediate application in practice. In fact, one of the candidates for the Key Exchange functionality, called DAGS, makes use of quasi-dyadic matrices to provide compact keys for the scheme.

The most important pre-quantum threat to AES-128 is the 1994 van Oorschot-Wiener parallel rho method, a low-communication parallel pre-quantum multi-target preimage-search algorithm. This algorithm uses a mesh of p small processors, each running for approximately $2^{128}/pt$ fast steps, to find one of $t$ independent AES keys $k_1$,…, $k_t$, given the ciphertexts AES_k_1(0), …,AES_k_t(0) for a shared plaintext $0$. NIST has claimed a high post-quantum security level for AES-128, starting from the following rationale Grover’s algorithm requires a long-running serial computation, which is difficult to implement in practice. In a realistic attack, one has to run many smaller instances of the algorithm in parallel, which makes the quantum speedup less dramatic. NIST has also stated that resistance to multi-key attacks is desirable; but, in a realistic parallel setting, a straightforward multi-key application of Grover’s algorithm costs more than targeting one key at a time. This paper introduces a different quantum algorithm for multi-target preimage search. This algorithm shows, in the same realistic parallel setting, that quantum preimage search benefits asymptotically from having multiple targets. The new algorithm requires a revision of NIST’s AES-128, AES-192, and AES-256 security claims.